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REPLY TO APPELLEE'S ANSWERING BRIEF
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations
which are determinative of the issues raised by Appellee WHWC's answering brief.
However, Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is applicable to the analysis of Tolman's
reply.

REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I
TOLMAN'S OBJECTION TO
THE THIRD-PARTY ATTORNEY
FEE INSTRUCTION WAS ADEQUATE
1.

Tolman's Objection Was Sufficient in These Circumstances.

Tolman's objection to the third-party attorney fees instruction was made during
counsels' conference with the trial judge at which the instructions were reviewed before
submission to the jury. The objection is found at T. 799-800, which pages are attached as
Addendum No. 1. This on-the-record exception to the instruction challenged in this
appeal is cited at lines 5-6, page 13, of Appellant Tolman's brief.
In Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital. 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992), the sole issue on
appeal was review of the trial court's instruction to the jury. Objections had been made,
but they "were not textbook examples of specificity." Jd. at 272. The Supreme Court noted
that of two reasons recognized in Utah case law for requiring objections to jury
1

instructions-preservation for appeal and notice to the trial court of the claimed error in the
instructions-the "primary" reason is notice to the court. Id. Therefore, where an objection
to a jury instruction calls the trial court's attention to the fact and nature of the instruction's
flaw, the objection has fulfilled its primary purpose.
Further, in discussing the sufficiency of the objections made in Nielsen, the
Supreme Court noted that "the objections could have been better stated if counsel had had
more time to work on them, but he had to dictate them under the stress and pressure of
a trial." id. In the instant case, WHWC's proposed instructions served on Friday, August
27, 1993 included no mention of the third-party attorney fee rule. R. 1125-1221. Trial
began on Monday, August 30 and continued through Thursday, September 2, 1993.
Some time on Thursday, WHWC filed a trial brief on several theories for recovery of
attorney fees, among which was the third-party rule. R. 1301-09. When the chambers
conference on jury instructions convened at 10:30 A.M. the next day, Instruction No. 15 had
been submitted. T. 799. The third-party attorney fee theory of recovery had not been
pleaded in WHWC's amended counterclaim (R. 378-395), and to Appellant Tolman's
counsel's best knowledge from their review of the record on appeal and of the transcript
of the trial proceedings, no notice of that claim for relief had been given to Tolman before
the last day of trial, September 2,1993. Thus, Tolman's counsel had been presented with
the third-party attorney fee theory for the first time perhaps sixteen hours before the
conference on the jury instructions and at the close of four full days of trial. Unlike counsel
in Nielsen, he did not have the luxury of dictating his objection but was required to make
it orally in chambers. He made the best objection he could and-as set forth below-it was
2

sufficient to alert the trial court to the instruction's errors and, therefore, should preserve
the issue for appellate review.
2.

Tolman's Objection Apprised the Trial Court that Two of the Three Elements of the
Third-Party Attorney Fee Rule Were Not Supported by the Facts of the Case.
The objection made by Tolman's trial counsel was adequate because two of the

three elements necessary of that theory were not present in this case: First, he objected
on the basis that the facts of the case did not demonstrate that Tolman had committed a
breach of any fiduciary duty owed to WHWC by dividing SIDCO's water distribution system
into thirds. The evidence was not disputed that WHWC accepted the three-way division
of SIDCO's water distribution system among SIDCO, Eaglebrook and WHWC by entering
the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement. In addition, WHWC's first elected memberpresident, Don Reusch, testified that WHWC considered itself bound by the Water
Agreement, including the acceptance by the water company initially of only one-third of
SIDCO's distribution system. T. 327. Later, in 1991, when WHWC entered a separate
agreement with Walter and SIDCO for SIDCO's development of additional subdivision
phases in Winchester Hills it again ratified the binding nature of the January 19, 1989
Water Agreement. EX. P-26. Second, the undisputed evidence before the trial court
established that either Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff were in privity concerning the
one-third interest in the water distribution system conveyed by SIDCO to Eaglebrook
which, in turn, conveyed it to Lava Bluff, or that they were at least so related in their
relationship under the January 19 and February 25, 1989 contracts that the third-party
attorney fee rule should not have been recognized as a theory of recovery available to

3

WHWC. Indeed, the trial court had already granted a partial summary judgment motion
to WHWC declaring that Lava Bluff and Tolman were collaterally estopped from
challenging an order in a prior lawsuit to the effect that Eaglebrook was bound to SIDCO
and WHWC under the terms of the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement. Privity in the
legal sense among Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff-or at least a similarity of interests
and common control among them sufficient to satisfy the requirements of collateral
estoppel-had become the law of the case.
The application of common law by trial courts presents questions of law which are
reviewable by this Court for correctness. If the evidence before the trial court was not
subject to substantial dispute, and that evidence established that one of the three elements
of the cause of action under the third-party attorney fee rule was not established or was
negated, it was legal error for the trial court to submit that claim to the jury. Tolman's trial
counsel argued that under the facts, the third-party attorney fee rule had no application.
For either of the reasons set forth above, he was correct. Therefore, Instruction No. 15
should not have been given.
In this case, two of the three elements of the common law theory of recovery under
the third-party attorney fee rule were negated by the evidence: There was there no breach
of a duty owed to WHWC by Tolman when SIDCO's water distribution was divided into
thirds, and under the law of the case Tolman and Lava Bluff had been held collaterally
estopped from challenging the application of the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement
against Eaglebrook. So, for purposes of analyzing the third-party attorney fee rule,
Tolman and Lava Bluff were "connected"-that is, not true third parties to the original
4

claimed breach. At least one of the three elements of the third-party attorney fee cause
of action—as delineated in Instruction No. 1 5 - was clearly negated. Therefore, it was
legally erroneous for the trial court to submit Instruction No. 15 to the jury.
3.

The Objection Points to the Trial Court's Plain Error.
In addition to his timely objection to the third-party attorney fee rule instruction,

Tolman's trial counsel had moved for a directed verdict on that claim. The basis of the
motion was essentially the same as he later urged in objecting to Instruction No. 15. T.
781-793. The trial court denied that motion.
In Henderson v. Mever. 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975) our Supreme Court held that it
was plain error for the trial court not to direct a verdict on the issue of liability, even where
Plaintiff had not made a motion (although she had requested a directed verdict instruction)
and the facts supported it. In Henderson, a motorist and her passenger were rear-ended
by another driver. The evidence showed the other driver to have been clearly negligent.
Notwithstanding her failure to move for a directed verdict, and notwithstanding the fact that
her passenger neither made a directed-verdict motion nor requested a directed-verdict
instruction, the Court held that the motorist's request for a directed verdict instruction had
sufficiently apprised the trial court, and the issue of liability should not have been given to
the jury. The Supreme Court stated:
The law is to the effect that one who does not move for a
directed verdict generally has no standing to urge on appeal
that the evidence does not support the judgment. However, an
exception exists where plain error appears in the record and
it would result in a miscarriage of justice to affirm the judgment,
[citing Rule 51, U.R.C.P.]

5

533 P.2d 291-92.
In the present case, Tolman's objection to Instruction No. 15 on the basis that the
facts and the law did not support submission of a third-party attorney fee claim to the jury
sufficiently apprised the trial court. Our district courts are held to know the common law
and to apply it correctly. The court below looked to Washington State pronouncements
of the common law in drafting the jury instruction on the third-party attorney fee rule.
Under that state's analysis of the third-party attorney fee rule, the fulcrum upon which the
rule balances is whether the lawsuit for which the attorney fees are claimed is brought or
defended by a third person-that is, a person not privy to the contract, agreement or events
out of which the litigation arises. See Armstrong Construction Company v Thomson. 390
P.2d 976, 979-80 (Wash. 1964), cited at pp. 13-14 of Appellant Tolman's brief.
This Court reviews the trial court's application of common law for correctness. It
was plain error for the trial court to deny Tolman's motion for a directed verdict on the thirdparty attorney fee claim. It was also plain error to overrule his later objection to Instruction
No. 15 because both the facts and the law of the case establish privity, or
"connectedness," sufficient to negate third-party status between Tolman and Lava Bluff.
WHWC's suggestion that Tolman's privity argument is defeated by the fact that
throughout the litigation Tolman treated Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff as entities separate
and distinct from himself is neither legally nor logically persuasive. In order for privity to
exist in the law's contemplation-for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel, or for
a third-party analysis under the third-party attorney fee rule-it is not necessary to
demonstrate that the persons and entities in question are identical. If they were, the privity
6

analysis would not be necessary in the first place. What is important for Tolman's privity
analysis-and is shown clearly by the evidence-is that Tolman owned and controlled
Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff, and that the property rights which were the subject of Lava
Bluffs claims against WHWC came to Lava Bluff through a succession of contracts and
conveyances originating with the SIDCO-Walter-Tolman-Eaglebrook separation agreement
and perpetuating SIDCO's plan for the final development of WHWC as a self-sustaining
and fully capitalized mutual water company.
Similarly, WHWC's suggestion that Tolman's argument is, in essence, an alter ego
position which frustrates public policy and requires that the corporate existence of
Eaglebrook and/or Lava Bluff be disregarded is fallacious. It is recognized that a privity
analysis for res judicata purposes does not require a party in a later suit to be the alter ego
of a party in the earlier suit; rather, it is sufficient if the party in the later action is the
successor in interest to the first party. CLS Associates. Ltd.. v. A
224 (Tex. App. Dallas 1988).

B

762 SW2d. 221,

Although WHWC's Amended Answer asserted the

affirmative defense that Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff were the alter egos of Tolman (T. 381),
WHWC neither pursued that claim at trial or requested that instructions related to that
defense be submitted to the jury.
The trial court erred. Tolman's objection to Jury Instruction No. 15 was sufficient
to alert the trial court to its error.

Therefore, this Court should set aside the award of

attorney fees against Tolman.

7

POINT II
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCE CALLS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
OF JURY INSTRUCTION 15

WHWC relies on Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)
for its position that this Court may not review the jury instructions because "special
circumstances" are not shown. See: Appellee WHWC's answering brief, pp. 22-23. The
reason the Crookston court did not review the jury instruction of the trial court in that case
is that no objection was raised at trial. 817 P.2d at 799.1 As detailed in Point I above,
in the instant case a timely and sufficient objection was made at trial.
Rule 51, Utah R. Civ. P., states: "Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement
[that objection be made to a jury instruction, the appellate court, in its discretion, and in the
interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to give an instruction." Therefore, even
if no objection had been made at trial, or if the objection were found to have been less than
distinct, this Court could make discretionary review of Instruction No. 15.
1.

Discretionary Review is Appropriate Where Jury Instruction is Confusing.
As detailed above, the sole issue on appeal in Neilsen v. Pioneer Vallev Hospital.

830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992) was review of the trial court's jury instructions because they
were confusing and contradictory. There, the Supreme Court noted that the objections
1

WHWC's brief quotes Crookston but does not explore the case law it cites. Hansen v.
Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) explains that the reason for requiring objections is to inform the appellate
court of the grounds on which a jury instruction is being challenged. In Hansen, the record "does not
indicate that an objection was made to the instructions actually given." Jd at 16. Previous to Hansen, both
Williams v. Llovd. 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166,167 (Utah 1965) and McCall v. Kendrick. 2 Utah 2d. 365,
274 P.2d 962, 963 (Utah 1954) assert the requirement of showing "special circumstances" requiring review
of jury instructions where no objection was made.
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presented were "not textbook examples of specificity" and were not made within the timing
parameters required by Rule 51. Id. at 272. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court exercised
its discretionary authority to review the instructions, found them to have been confusing
and contradictory, and on that basis reversed the decision of the trial court.
Following Nielsen, in Bradv v. Gibb. 886 P.2d 104 (Utah App. 1994), this Court
found that "[t]he trial court erred by giving contradictory and potentially confusing jury
instructions," and on that basis reversed the decision of the trial court without any
reference to the sufficiency of-or even the existence of-any objection to the jury
instructions at trial. In the instant case, as in Brady and Nielsen, the submission of
contradictory and potentially confusing instructions to the jury was error and calls for
appellate review regardless of the quality of objection to the instruction at trial.
2.

In This Case the Jury Instruction on the Third-Party Attorney Fee Rule Confused
the Jury.
In Badger v. Clavson. 18 Utah 2d 329, 332, 422 P.2d. 665, 666-67 (1967), the

Supreme Court said:
[a jury] instruction should be considered in its entirety, and
along with all of the other instructions given, to determine
whether they accomplished what was essential: explaining to
the jury in a manner understandable to them the issues of fact
and the law applicable thereto . . . .

The Nielsen court also noted that "jury instructions are to be read as a whole," and
considered the relationship among relevant instructions as well as the content of each. 830
P.2d at 274.

9

In the present case, Tolman objected at trial to Instructions No. 13, 14, 15 and 16,
all of which refer to fiduciary duty. T. 799-800. Instructions No. 15 and 16-specifically
regarding the application of the third-party attorney fee rule-also require a determination
by the jury as to whether the parties were "not connected," meaning "not in privity" under
the third-party attorney fee rule as adopted in Utah under South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack. 765
P.2d 1279,1282 (Utah App. 1988) citing from the Washington state pronouncement of the
rule in Morgan v. Roller. 794 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). See Appellant
Tolman's brief at pp. 12-14.
As detailed in Appellant Tolman's brief at pages 20-24, Instructions No. 13 through
16 failed to differentiate between the defined fiduciary relationship and the undefined
"connectedness" concept presented in Instructions No. 15 and 16. The jury was confused
by this, requested clarification of it, and still committed error in applying the "connected"
concept. This Court will recall that the jury sent a question to the trial court stating that it
was having difficulty understanding the "not connected" element of Instruction No. 16
pertaining to the third-party attorney fee rule in the situation involving Tolman's deed of
125 acre feet of WHWC water to his wife and himself. After receiving the best additional
instruction the trial court was able to give, the jury returned a verdict against Tolman,
having found that he and his wife were "not connected." Thereafter, at the bench trial on
the issue of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, the trial court realized that under
the law and the terms of the deed by which the 125 acre feet of water had been conveyed,
Tolman and his wife had to be considered legally "connected." Therefore, an essential
element of the cause of action for an award of third party-attorney fees was negated, and

10

on that basis the trial court sua sponte set aside the jury's verdict against Tolman for an
award of attorney fees related to his conveyance of WHWC's 125 acre feet of water.
The jury made their finding on Instruction No. 15 based on precisely the same
confusing information as they applied in their finding on Instruction 16, and in doing so
they made the same prejudicial error. The trial court should have set aside the attorney
fee award based on Tollman's "connection" with Lava Bluff just as it did based on Tolman's
"connection" with his wife. The factual and legal privity between Tolman and Lava Bluff
was clearly established by the facts and under the law of the case (by order of the trial
court granting WHWC's motion for partial summary judgment earlier in the proceedings),
but the jury did not understand the concept-as evidenced both by their question on the
wording by which it was presented in Instruction No. 16 and by their error in applying that
wording.2
Under Nielsen and Brady, supra, where "the potential for confusion" of the jury by
the instruction given them is "substantial" (Nielsen at 275) or "high" (Brady at 107), review
of the instruction is appropriate, and reversal of error caused by that confusion is called
for. In the instant case, the confusion of the jury was not just "potential." As the record
shows, the jury in this case was ID fact confused. Review of the confusing instruction and
of the error it caused is appropriate and necessary.

The trial court's failure to correct the jury's misconception as to Instruction No. 15~as it did
as to Instruction No. 16—is plain error, mandating reversal on appeal.

11

3.

Jury Instruction No. 15 Was Self-Contradictory.
In addition to its inconsistency with the other instructions on fiduciary responsibility

and the third-party attorney fee rule, Instruction No. 15 presented the jury with the task of
making three findings which were logically incompatible with one another under the facts
of this case. See Appellant Tolman's brief, p. 24. WHWC makes much of defending the
internal consistency of "Subpart (2)" of Instruction No. 15 (pages 28-30 of WHWC's
answering brief), urging a general, rather than specific, finding of foreseeability in
negligence analysis as the proper basis for interpreting "Subpart (2)" of the Instruction.
The analogy fails, because "litigation generally" is foreseeable from every possible breach
of any duty, and the foreseeable litigation contemplated by the third-party attorney fee rule
is much more specific to the issues of the breach in question. Further, Tolman's position
is not, as WHWC argues, that "subpart (2)M is internally inconsistent. Rather, Tolman
points out that no logical reasoning can reconcile all of the three subparts of Instruction
No. 15.
4.

Instruction No. 15 So Confused the Jury as to Result in Prejudicial Error.
Tolman has demonstrated the illogic within Instruction No. 15 and the confusion of

the jury as to its "not connected" requirement. The jury in this case was not only likely to
be confused by this instruction, they were in fact confused by it. Had they properly
understood the concept of "connectedness" as privity of legal interest and as distinct from
fiduciary responsibility, they would have reached a different conclusion. Under Brady and
Nielsen, supra, the instruction should therefore be reviewed by this Court and the error
flowing from the instruction should be reversed.
12

CONCLUSION IN REPLY
WHWC presented the third-party attorney fee theory of recovery literally at the last
hour. The facts and evidence in this case simply do not support application of that theory,
and Tolman's trial counsel did not have adequate opportunity to detail the numerous ways
in which Instruction 15 was improper. Nevertheless, objection to the instruction was made,
and the objection was sufficient to notify the court that the facts and evidence of the case
were incongruent with the elements of the third-party attorney fee rule. The trial court's
failure to correct the instruction was plain error.
In addition, Instruction 15 was confusing-inherently, and in the context of the case
and the other instructions on the third-party attorney fee rule. Utah's appellate courts
review jury instructions where, as here, they are confusing and clarification would have
produced a different jury finding. The trial court's error in failing to correct the jury
instruction, as it was apprised by Tolman was prejudicial. It must now be reviewed and
corrected by this Court.

13

RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S CROSS-APPEAL
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the cross-appeal pursuant to U.C.A.
§78-2(a)-3(2)(k) (Sup. 1994).
STATEMENT OF CROSS-APPEAL ISSUES
Cross-Appellees Tolman and Eaglebrook disagree that U 1 of Cross-Appellant
Winchester Hills Water Company's ("WHWC") statement of cross-appeal issues correctly
states that issue on appeal. At the close of the trial WHWC took the position that Tolman
was liable to it for 25 acre feet of water, not Eaglebrook. The directed verdict against
WHWC was made, and argued, with respect to Tolman, not Eaglebrook. Therefore,
WHWC's statement of its first issue on appeal is inaccurate. Cross-Appellees Tolman and
Eaglebrook address this issue in Point I of this responding brief, below.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations
which are determinative of the issues appealed by Cross-Appellant WHWC.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
Cross-Appellant WHWC, at page 2 of its answering brief, agrees that Appellant

Tolman's brief correctly sets forth the nature of the case, the court proceedings and the
disposition of the case. Tolman's brief states, at page 4: "WHWC cross-appeals from the
trial court's ruling that Tolman was not obligated to provide 25 acre feet of water to

14

WHWC, . . .

." This comports with WHWC's Notice of Appeal which states that the

appeal was taken from paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the final Judgment entered on October
5, 1993, wherein U 5 is recited as follows:
5.
WHWC's claims against Counterclaim Defendant
R.C. Tolman for 25 acre feet of water or any shortfall in water
are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Cross-Appellees' Statement of Facts in Response to Cross Appellant WHWC's
Statement of Facts.
Cross-Appellees Tolman and Eaglebrook make this responding statement of facts

to correct certain inaccurate assertions and inferences in Cross-Appellant WHWC's
statement of relevant facts which begins at page 2 of WHWC's brief:
As part of SIDCO's sale of Winchester Hills Subdivision lots, it entered into a water
user agreement with each lot purchaser through its controlled water company, WHWC,
which entitled the lot owner to receive water service through WHWC. T. 134,138-39, 309,
517-18, 525. SIDCO's intent was to have each purchaser of a lot also own an interest in
WHWC. T. 217-18. SIDCO's responsibility under the water user agreements was to
ensure that 1.12 acre feet of water, that is, 1,000 gallons per day, was available for each
lot purchased in Phases I and II. T. 223. As of the end of 1988, no lot purchasers had
been issued WHWC water stock certificates (T. 221), and SIDCO retained all WHWC
voting stock under its control.

T. 134, 138-39.

In performance of the water user

agreements with lot owners, SIDCO had deeded water rights to WHWC as needed in the
course of selling those lots prior to the December 31, 1988, separation between Walter
and Tolman. T. 145, 281-82.
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Under the February 25,1989 settlement agreement which was effective December
31,1988, each lot owner in Phases I and II was to be issued one share of WHWC culinary
water stock. Ex. P-15,1[8. In furtherance of that agreement, SIDCO and WHWC entered
the January 19,1989 Water Agreement which provided that the Phase I and II lot owners
would be issued a share of WHWC water stock in exchange for their water user
agreements. Ex. P-18, If 6. WHWC's Articles of Incorporation provided that its members'
water shares are appurtenant to their purchased lots, and that those shares are to be
issued only pursuant to, and in association with, the purchase of a lot. Ex. P-4, Art. X-XII.
WHWC's articles and by-laws made all culinary water stock assessable. Ex. P-4, Art. XI;
Ex. D-58, Art. X. Hook-up fees and assessments for WHWC water service were charged
to the lot purchasers in addition to the purchase price paid to SIDCO for the lot and water
share. Ex. P-4, Art. XI.
The February 25, 1989 settlement agreement also provided that one share of
WHWC water stock was to be issued to both SIDCO and Eaglebrook for each unsold lot
in Phases I and II which SIDCO and Eaglebrook would own after December 31, 1988. Ex.
P-15,1f 8. However, unlike the WHWC stock issued to lot owners which was assessable,
the stock which was to be issued to "SIDCO and/or its assignee [Eaglebrook]" under the
January 19,1989 Water Agreement for those unsold lots was not to be subject to regular
assessments. Rather, those shares for the unsold lots would only be subject to stand-by
assessments of $1 per month per lot
until such time as SIDCO and/or its assignee sells said lot(s)
to a bona-fide purchaser for value or connects said lot(s) to
the water distribution system, whichever occurs first. In the
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event SIDCO and/or its assignee connects said lot to the water
distribution system, SIDCO and/or its assignee shall pay the
customary connection fee and other assessments regularly
assessed by WHWC. Otherwise, SIDCO and/or its assignees
shall not be obligated to pay connection fees or assessments
other than as set forth herein.
Ex. P-18,1f2.
As of December 31, 1988, a total of 211 lots had been developed in Phases I and
II of Winchester Hills Subdivision. However, only about 160 of those lots had been sold
to purchasers. T. 218-19. Of the 51 developed lots which remained unsold, 28 were
transferred to Eaglebrook by the terms of the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement.
T. 577; Ex. P-15, U a(1). The other 23 unsold lots remained in SIDCO's inventory. Tolman
testified that 179 acre feet of water was needed to provide 1,000 gallons per day to the lots
in Phases I and II which SIDCO had been sold as of December 31,1988, and that WHWC
owned more than 179 acre feet of water at that time. T. 577-78. So, WHWC had more
than sufficient water rights to supply the Phase I and II lot owners as of December 31,
1988. T. 579. Tolman agreed that more water rights would have to be transferred to
WHWC in order for it to furnish water service to the remaining 51 lots in Phases I and II
when they were sold after 1988 (T. 504-06), but that as of December 31, 1988, there was
no obligation for SIDCO to provide water through WHWC for those unsold lots. T. 580-81.
Tolman testified, accordingly, that no water shortfall existed in WHWC as of December 31,
1988, which was the cut-off date for SIDCO obligations which Eaglebrook was to share
under the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement. T. 533. The 205 acre feet of water
available for WHWC's use in Phases I and II on December 31, 1988, was more than
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adequate to provide water service to each lot owner who had purchased a lot from SIDCO
up to that date. T. 238.
Walter, the controlling owner of SIDCO and president of WHWC who signed the
January 19, 1989 Water Agreement for SIDCO and WHWC, testified that WHWC's
acknowledgment regarding its 235 acre feet of water right was based on his belief that that
amount was sufficient to provide culinary water service for all lots in Phases I and II, but
was in error. T. 168, 231, 272. The newly-elected WHWC officers discovered that error
in May 1989 and tried to negotiate with SIDCO and Eaglebrook. T. 359. The moratorium
on water hook-ups was put in place after WHWC's officers learned that in April 1989
Tolman had deeded 125 acre feet of the 235 acre feet of water right recited in the January
19, 1989 Water Agreement to his wife and himself. T. 579. In February 1990, after the
125 acre feet came back to WHWC as a result of the litigation with Tolman, WHWC
started selling water hook-ups in Phases I and II again. T. 376. There is no testimony that
additional water was conveyed into WHWC after May 1989, and before February 1990,
to add to the 235 acre feet recited in the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement. Walter's
company, SIDCO, did not convey the additional 25 acre feet of water to WHWC-which
Walter and WHWC asserted at trial was SIDCO's share of the claimed 50 acre feet water
shortfall needed for Phases I and II—until July 1991 in connection with a new agreement
among WHWC, SIDCO and Walter for SIDCO's development of additional lots in entirely
new phases of the Winchester Hills Subdivision area. Ex. P-26. T. 385. Such additional
development was contemplated under If 4 of the January 19,1989 Water Agreement which
required the developer (either SIDCO or Eaglebrook) to convey the water rights which
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would be needed by WHWC to provide culinary water service to the additional lots sold.
T. 277, 345 and 385.
Tolman's affirmative response to WHWC's counsel's questions at trial regarding
"his" obligations under the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement for one-half of
SIDCO's liabilities through December 31, 1988 were made in his capacity as the
controlling owner of Eaglebrook. T. 532, 538-39. Eaglebrook was the entity which bound
itself to that performance under the February 25th agreement; Tolman had not done so in
his individual capacity. Ex. P-15, If 1b(5); T. 532. The entirety of Tolman's trial testimony,
and the context of these particular questions and answers, make this fact clear. The only
personal obligations Tolman assumed under the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement
were specific indemnity and hold harmless agreements. Ex. P-18, Iffl 3 and 6. No such
indemnification or hold harmless claims are the subject matter of this lawsuit.
WHWC's statement of facts also erroneously recites that in an earlier lawsuit
Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff "each stipulated that they were bound by the terms of
the January 19, 1989, agreement." The written stipulation in question shows that it was
agreed only that SIDCO and Eaglebrook were bound by the January 1989 Water
Agreement. Ex. D-59, fl 10. The order entered by the Fifth District Court pursuant to that
stipulation provided likewise: that the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement with WHWC
bound and benefitted SIDCO and Eaglebrook. Neither the stipulation nor the order bound
Tolman to perform the Water Agreement. R. 1597-98.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Cross-Appellees Tolman and Eaglebrook contend that WHWC's cross-appeal claim
against Eaglebrook for 125 acre feet of water has been waived. At the conclusion of the
trial during argument on Cross-Appellees' directed verdict motions, WHWC stated that its
claim for 125 acre feet of water was made against Tolman, not Eaglebrook. In WHWC's
Notice of Appeal it designated the provisions in the trial court's order that dismissed the
claim against Tolman for 25 acre feet of water as the order from which appeal was taken.
Now, in WHWC's cross-appeal brief it attempts to assert the claim for 25 acre feet of water
against Eaglebrook. It does this by confusing the distinction between Tolman, as the
owner of Eaglebrook, and Eaglebrook as a distinct corporate entity.

Tolman and

Eaglebrook contend the waiver of any claim against Eaglebrook was clear, and the attempt
to assert such a claim on this appeal is not timely.
Cross-Appellee Tolman contends that the trial court's ruling in his favor directing
a verdict against WHWC on its claim against him for 25 acre of water was legally correct
under the unambiguous terms of the written contracts in question. If SIDCO had any
obligation to furnish water rights to WHWC as of December 31st, 1988, it was
Eaglebrook's obligation to share in the performance of that SIDCO obligation under the
February 25, 1989 agreement, and not Tolman's. Tolman's sole obligation, personally,
under the February 25th settlement agreement which could in any way relate to WHWC's
claim was his agreement to indemnify and hold harmless SIDCO from obligations which
existed as of December 31st, 1988. No claim is made by WHWC against SIDCO in this
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action, and no indemnity or hold harmless agreement of the kind enforceable under the
February 25, 1989 settlement agreement is pleaded.
Lastly, Cross-Appellees Tolman and Eaglebrook contend the undisputed evidence
and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom clearly show that SIDCO did not owe
WHWC any water rights as of December 31,1988, to cure any alleged "shortfall" of water
rights required to service Phase I and II lot owners.
ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE
TO CROSS-APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURTS DIRECTED VERDICT
AGAINST WHWC ON ITS CLAIM FOR
25 ACRE FEET OF WATER WAS CORRECT
1.

WHWC Waived Anv Claim Against Eaalebrook for 25 Acre Feet of Water.
At the close of all the evidence, Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff made a directed

verdict motion against WHWC on the issues which are the subject of this appeal, namely,
for the conveyance to WHWC of the one-third interest in the water distribution system held
by Lava Bluff, for delivery of 25 acre feet of water to WHWC and for an award of attorney
fees. In the course of his response to those motions, WHWC's counsel stated:
The testimony is clear that as of the 31st of December, there
was a 50 acre shortfall. We claim that pursuant to the
February 25th, 1989 agreement, that Mr. Tolman became
liable for half of the liabilities of SIDCO. It's our position that
that water shortage was a liability as of December 31st of
1988, and we would ask it pursuant - we would seek 25 acre
feet pursuant to that.
T. 788.
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The trial court ruled against WHWC on the 25 acre feet of water issue and granted
the directed verdict motion in favor of Tolman. In the Judgment entered on October 5,
1993, from which WHWC appeals, the court ordered at paragraph 5 as follows:
5.
WHWC's claims against Counterclaim Defendant R.C.
Tolman for 25 acre feet of water or any shortfall in water are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.

T. 1361; Addendum 2 to Appellant Tolman's brief.
Consistent with WHWC's announced position stated during argument on the
directed verdict motions which is quoted above, the prefatory language in the Judgment
drafted by WHWC's counsel recited, at page 4, that "WHWC further sought delivery of 25
acre feet of water from R. C. Tolman pursuant to the terms of the February 25, 1989
Agreement." T. 1357. In the trial court's findings and conclusions it makes apparent the
basis for its ruling against WHWC on the 25 acre feet of water issue.
Findings, paragraph 5:
5.
WHWC agreed to be bound by the January 19, 1989
[Water] Agreement. Pursuant to the January 19, 1989
Agreement, WHWC agreed that it owned sufficient water to
service Phases I and II in the Winchester Hills area.
Conclusions, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6:
4.
As of December 31,1988, there was no water shortfall
owed to WHWC by any of the plaintiffs.
5.
Pursuant to the January 19, 1989 [Water] Agreement,
WHWC is bound by the statement therein that there is
sufficient water to service Phases I and II.
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6.
While WHWC may have a claim against SIDCO for
additional water rights, the Court concludes that R.C. Tolman
has no contractual liability to provide 25 acre feet of water to
WHWC.
T. 1359-60; Addendum 2 to Appellant Tolman's brief.
WHWC's Notice of Appeal states that appeal was taken only from paragraphs 3,
4 and 5 of the Judgment entered on October 5, 1993. Significantly, WHWC's Notice of
Appeal does not include specification of any error by the trial court in refusing to make a
judgment or award against Eaglebrook for delivery of 25 acre feet of water. Accordingly,
any claims of this nature by WHWC against Eaglebrook have been waived.
WHWC's Docketing Statement attempts, apparently, to raise a claim against
Eaglebrook by expanding the statement of the issue against Tolman in its Notice of Appeal
to include sub-issues against Eaglebrook which challenge the propriety of the trial courts
directed verdict against it on the 25 acre feet issue by suggesting the evidence was
sufficient to establish a viable jury question as to Eaglebrook's liability. See: Docketing
Statement, pages 6-8. WHWC narrows this focus on Eaglebrook in Point I of its crossappeal argument by limiting the description of the issues on appeal as being centered in
the trial court's directed verdict ruling against WHWC on a claim that Eaglebrook was
liable for the 25 acre feet of water. In light of WHWC's unequivocal representation to the
trial court that its claim for 25 acre feet of water was against Tolman, the argument now
presented against Eaglebrook for this relief is legally barred because any such claim was
waived at trial, and it is not to be considered as it is now first raised on appeal.
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The phrasing of WHWC's cross-appeal argument against Eaglebrook contradicts
its clear statements both to the trial court and in its Notice of Appeal by repeatedly
referring to a claim against "Tolman, through Eaglebrook." The distinction between
Tolman, an individual, and Eaglebrook, the corporation, cannot be disregarded so easily.
WHWC pleaded in the Sixth Defense of its Amended Answer that Eaglebrook Corporation
was the alter ego of Tolman. T. 381. However, at trial WHWC presented no evidence as
to that issue, and the jury instructions submitted by WHWC prior to trial contained nothing
addressed to that issue. T. 1185-1221. Accordingly, the alter ego claim was abandoned.
For these reasons, WHWC's attempt to disregard the legal and factual distinction between
Tolman and Eaglebrook, and to assert a claim of Eaglebrook's liability for the 25 acre feet
at this time is disingenuous.
2.

Tolman Was Not Contractually Responsible for Any Obligation SIDCO May Have
Had to Provide Any Water to WHWC as of December 31. 1988.
With regard to the issue of who was obligated to provide water rights to WHWC in

order for it to service Winchester Hills Subdivision lot owners the facts regarding SIDCO's
conveyance of water rights to WHWC as Winchester Hills lots were developed and the
terms of the January 19 and February 25, 1989 written agreements are undisputed and
unambiguous. It was on this basis that the trial court granted the directed verdict motion
in favor of Tolman and against WHWC, and the court was legally correct and factually
justified in doing so.
Prior to the December 1988 business separation between Walters and Tolman, it
was SIDCO who sold developed lots and entered into the water user agreements through
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its controlled water company, WHWC, with the lot purchasers.

It was SIDCO who

transferred water rights to WHWC on an as-needed basis to enable the water company
to provide culinary water service to the lot owners. Therefore, as of December 31, 1988,
SIDCO was the sole entity obligated to provide water to WHWC for the benefit of its
subdivision lot purchasers. Toiman and Walters had arrived at their settlement agreement
as of the end of 1988 (T. 154), and Toiman had resigned as an officer and director of
SIDCO effective December 31, 1988. Ex. P-13. In furtherance of that understanding,
Walters entered the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement on behalf of both SIDCO and
WHWC. Ex. P-18. Toiman was not a party to the Water Agreement, and the reference
to "SIDCO and/or its assignee" in that agreement was determined in subsequent litigation
to mean "SIDCO and/or Eaglebrook."

Ex. D-59; T. 1597-98.

It was in that Water

Agreement of January 19th that Walter, acting as owner of SIDCO and president of
WHWC, first referred to the water requirements for Phases I and II and attempted to
quantify them by acknowledging that the existing 235 acre feet of water rights WHWC
owned was sufficient to service of the Phase I and II lots, both sold and unsold. The
drafting and execution of the January 19th Water Agreement took place without Tolman's
participation or approval, and occurred 19 days after the December 31, 1988 effective date
of his separation agreement with Walter. When the separation agreement was finalized
on February 28, 1989, Eaglebrook agreed that one-half of SIDCO's obligations "through
December 31, 1988" could be transferred to it. WHWC contends that the claimed
"shortfall" in its water rights for Phases I and II as of December 1988 is one of those "other
SIDCO liabilities." Even so, the only obligation Toiman assumed, personally, under the
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February 25, 1989 Agreement which could conceivably have any relation at all to
WHWC'S claim for the water shortfall is the provision of paragraph 3 of that agreement
which provides that Tolman would indemnify and hold SIDCO harmless for one-half of any
claim brought against SIDCO for an obligation incurred through December 31, 1988.
SIDCO is not a party to this action, and no indemnity or hold harmless claim has been
made against Tolman by that company.
The trial court directed a verdict against WHWC on the basis of these unambiguous
contract terms and the undisputed evidence that it was SIDCO's obligation to see that
water was transferred to WHWC to supply the needs of its lot purchasers under the water
user agreements. In ruling, Judge Eves stated:
That responsibility [to make sure that WHWC had adequate
water for its residents] under all the agreements, falls squarely
on the shoulders of SIDCO. They are the ones who agreed to
provide the water; they are the ones who should be held
responsible. . . . His [Tolman's] responsibility under the
February agreement was half of the liabilities of SIDCO [via
indemnification] up to December 31st, 1988. The liability for
providing 235 acre feet of water to Winchester Hills Water
Company did not even arise until 19 days later. So, the
Motion for Summary Judgment [directed verdict] as to the
question of the 25 acre feet of water is granted.
T. 793-95.
The trial court's findings and conclusions, cited in sub-paragraph 1 of this Point I,
above, were consistent with this ruling and are helpful to this Court in reviewing the
correctness of the trial court's disposition of the directed verdict motion. There is no
dispute that the agreements to provide water rights to WHWC for the use of SIDCO's lot
purchasers were made by SIDCO, the corporation, and not by its shareholder-owners,
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Walter and Tolman. Whether a contract exists, and its terms, are questions of law
reversible for correctness. Whether the trial court properly interpreted the terms of the
January 19th Water Agreement and the February 25th settlement agreement is also a
question of law. Cross-Appellees Tolman and Eaglebrook suggest the undisputed facts
and unambiguous contract terms support the trial court's conclusion that as of the end of
1988 there was no water shortfall owed to WHWC by any of the plaintiffs and that Tolman,
specifically, has no contractual liability whatever to provide 25 acre feet of water to
WHWC.
3.

SIDCO Was Not Obligated to Provide WHWC an Additional 50 Acre Feet of Water
Rights as of December 31. 1988.
The evidence was clear that SIDCO transferred water rights to WHWC as required

in the course of developing lots to insure that the lot purchasers could receive 1,000
gallons per day of culinary water under their water user agreements. As of the end of
1988, 211 lots had been developed in Phases I and II, but only 160 had been sold to lot
owners. The 205 acre feet of WHWC's water rights available out of the total 235 it owned
was sufficient to supply the 1,000 gallons per day requirement for those 160 lot owners.
Tolman's testimony that 179 acre feet of water would be sufficient to supply the agreed
culinary water to those lot owners was not rebutted. There was no evidence that other lots
had been sold in Phases I or II for which demands had been made on WHWC for water
service which could not be met by WHWC.
The significance of the foregoing recital is this: In the February 25, 1989 separation
agreement it was provided, at j[ 8, that WHWC would issue one share of culinary water
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stock to each lot owner in Phases I and II, and also issue one share of water stock to
SIDCO and one share to Eaglebrook for each of the unsold lots and that additional shares
of water stock would be issued to SIDCO and Eaglebrook for further Winchester Hills
Subdivision lots if any excess WHWC water rights remaining after the shares for the
Phase I and II lots-both sold and unsold-had been issued and, after any excess water
was expended, the developers would convey more water to WHWC. The conclusion to
be drawn from this contractual arrangement confirms what the evidence otherwise showed
SIDCO's obligation to have been with regard to transferring water rights to WHWC prior
to that agreement: water rights were transferred to WHWC by SIDCO as lots were sold
and the need arose to provide water service to the lot owners.
The fact that unsold developed lots and lots which were owned by third-party
purchasers were treated differently with respect to WHWC's need for owning water rights
was also confirmed by terms of the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement related to the
assessments. Under WHWC's articles and by-laws, lot owners who were entitled to a
share of culinary water stock were obligated to pay assessments in addition to the
purchase price for the lot (which included a water user agreement) and a hook-up fee.
Under the January 19th Water Agreement, SIDCO and Eaglebrook were not obligated to
pay assessments on the water stock that would be issued to them for each of the unsold
Phase I and II lots distributed under the February 25th settlement agreement until each lot
was sold to a bona fide purchaser or until SIDCO or Eaglebrook connected the lot to
WHWC's system. Until either of those events occurred, SIDCO and Eaglebrook were
obligated to pay only a stand-by assessment of $1 per month per lot. This confirms, again,
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the basic arrangement regarding SIDCO's obligation to provide water rights to WHWC,
that is, water rights were transferred to the water company as lots were sold and the need
to provide water service to a lot owner arose. Until that occurred, SIDCO was not
obligated to transfer water rights to WHWC because WHWC was not obligated to provide
culinary water service to a lot owner.
The newly elected officers of WHWC discovered shortly after taking office in May
1989 that the 235 acre feet of water recited in the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement
would not be sufficient to eventually service all the lots in Phases I and II, and they began
negotiating with SIDCO and Eaglebrook regarding Walter's calculation error. They also
soon learned that Tolman had deeded 125 of those 235 acre feet to his wife and himself
for the purpose, as Tolman testified, of forcing SIDCO to transfer the agreed one-third
share of its water distribution system to WHWC in compliance with the February 25, 1989
settlement agreement. With that 125 acre feet no longer titled in WHWC-although it was
always available for WHWC's use for its lot owners-the water company's officers imposed
a moratorium on water hook-ups. Because they could not settle the issue with Tolman
they sued and, in February 1990, recovered the 125 acre feet. At that time WHWC again
began selling water hook-ups in Phases I and II to lot purchasers. There is no evidence
that any additional water rights were transferred to WHWC by SIDCO between the dates
of the January 19 and February 1989 agreements and the return from Tolman of the 125
acre feet of water, and it is not disputed that SIDCO did not transfer the 25 acre feet of
water which it claimed was its share of the December 1988 "shortfall" until it entered the
separate agreement with WHWC in July 1991 to develop additional lots in new phases of
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new phases of the Winchester Hills Subdivision area. The reasonable conclusion to be
drawn from this evidence is that WHWC had more than sufficient water rights to service
its existing lot owners in Phases I and II as of the end of December 1988, and, therefore,
there was no water shortfall at that time. This is so because with no additional conveyance
of water rights to WHWC by SIDCO to augment the 205 acre feet of water which was
available for service to lot owners as of December 1988, WHWC began issuing more
water hook-ups to lot owners in Phases I and II in February 1990, as soon as the 125 acre
feet of water-which was part of the 205 acre feet of water owned by WHWC at the end of
December 1988-had been reacquired.
This evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, viewed in a
light most favorable to WHWC, compels the conclusion that no shortfall of water rights in
WHWC existed as of December 31, 1988, which SIDCO was obligated to provide. It was
established, and Tolman did not dispute, that at least 255 acre feet of water would be
required to provide culinary water service for all of the 211 lots in Phases I and II.
However, as of the end of December 1988, all of those lots had not been sold, and SIDCO
had no obligation to provide WHWC with water rights beyond what was needed to provide
culinary water service to the existing 160 lot owners. SIDCO had no obligation to provide
WHWC water rights for which there was no contractual demand by lot owners.
The fact that the January 19 and February 25, 1989 agreements contained
provisions contemplating issuance of culinary water stock to SIDCO and Eaglebrook out
of WHWC's excess water rights until such time as those excess water rights were
exhausted and the developers' obligation to provide more water arose, and the fact that
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shares of water stock issued to SIDCO and Eaglebrook for unsold subdivision lots would
not be charged regular assessments until sold to a third-party or connected to the WHWC
system by the developer, and the fact that WHWC would again begin selling water hookups to lot purchasers in Phases I and II in February 1990 after recovering the 125 acre feet
from Tolman without any other water rights being transferred to it by SIDCO then existed
as of December 31,1988, satisfy the requirement of the legal sufficiency of the evidence,
including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, supporting the trial court's grant
of the directed verdict against WHWC on its claim for recovery of 25 acre feet of water.
The plain fact is there was no shortfall of water to WHWC as of the end of December 1988
which made it impossible for WHWC to supply its lot owners. Accordingly, there was no
obligation on the part of SIDCO to transfer any additional water rights to WHWC at that
time.
The trial court found that no water shortfall existed as of December 31 st, 1988, for
which any of the plaintiffs was obligated. The trial court also found that Tolman was not
contractually obligated to share SIDCO's obligations, if any, to WHWC for any water
shortfall as of December 31, 1988. In ruling on the directed verdict motions, the trial court
below did not sit as a trier of fact. However, these findings make apparent the basis for
the court's ruling, and they direct this Court to the evidence and inferences therefrom
which are to be looked to in determining the correctness of the directed verdict ruling. This
Court likewise, should also be persuaded by that evidence that a directed verdict ruling
against WHWC on the 25 acre feet of water claimed was proper.
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POINT II
THE TERMS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST IMPOSED ON EAGLEBROOK
WERE NOT AN ABUSE OF
EQUITABLE DISCRETION.
In constructive trust and resulting trust cases, the trial court can be called upon to
alter a deed or other writing in order to effectuate an equitable result between the parties
or to carry out their intent under the circumstances. Matter of Estate of Hock. 655 P. 2d
1111 (Utah 1982). In this case, the court below did this by ordering Lava Bluff to return
to Eaglebrook the title it held to the one-third of SIDCO's water distribution system which
had been conveyed to Eaglebrook for the purposes contemplated by the January 19, 1989
Water Agreement and the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement. Those contracts
contemplated an arrangement with WHWC to issue water stock to the lot owners to protect
their interests and to SIDCO and Eaglebrook, as the subdivision developers, to protect
their interests.

The trial court ruled as a matter of law that under those contracts

Eaglebrook's sole right in the one-third share of SIDCO's water distribution system was to
hold it until transfered to WHWC for the development of subdivision lots. T. 637. The trial
court's ruling was more akin to the imposition of resulting trust than a constructive trust in
that the essential element of a resulting trust is the finding of an intent that property be
held for the benefit of another. Baker v. Patte. 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984). Constructive
trusts generally are not based upon an intention of the parties. Parks v. Zions First
National Bank. 673 P. 2d 590 (Utah).
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The trial court's basis for imposing the trust on Eaglebrook arose out of the
contractual plan devised by the Winchester Hills Subdivision developers, Tolman and
Walter, to eventually transfer all of SIDCO's water distribution system to WHWC. The trial
court did not deem it necessary, nor did WHWC request, that the January 19 and February
25,1989 agreements be invalidated because the division of the water distribution system
could be argued to be a breach of the developers' fiduciary duties to WHWC. Indeed,
WHWC's counsel conceded in argument on the directed verdicts at the close of all the
evidence that, "I guess what I'm saying, Your Honor, is we [WHWC] would like a
constructive trust imposed on that property [Eaglebrook's one-third interest in the Water
Agreement.]" T. 787.
The trial court ordered the equitable relief WHWC had requested against Lava
Bluff, that is, that it be required to return the one-third interest in the water distribution
system it had received from Eaglebrook.

Then, in imposing a constructive trust on

Eaglebrook's bare legal title to that property, it effectuated the intent of SIDCO, Eaglebrook
and WHWC, as expressed in the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement. That agreement
had been made for WHWC's benefit and was subsequently acknowledged by WHWC's
member-officers as being binding upon the water company. Under these circumstances
it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering Eaglebrook to
convey the one-third interest to WHWC at the present time.
The terms of the January 19th Water Agreement state the circumstances under
which Eaglebrook can use its one-third share of the water distribution system, and by
virtue of the trial court's imposition of the trust Eaglebrook is prohibited from doing
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anything else with that property. Indeed, WHWC has proceeded with the other developer,
SIDCO, in the development of additional subdivision phase lots by accepting the
conveyance of SIDCO's one-third interest in the water distribution SIDCO obtained under
the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement. This agreement with SIDCO was the July
24, 1991 agreement.

Ex. P-26.

A future agreement with similar purposes can be

contemplated.
So, although the trial court might have described the trust it imposed on Eaglebrook
as a resulting trust, rather than a constructive trust, the important factor for this Court's
consideration of WHWC's appeal is that the legitimate interests of both parties,
Eaglebrook and WHWC, have been protected by the trust terms as imposed by the trial
court.
WHWC is simply wrong in alleging the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
impose trust terms that were "remedial" and that "answered the demands of equity." The
trial court remedied the equitable wrong it found by ordering Lava Bluff to return title to
Eaglebrook, and it answered the demands of equity by preserving the legitimate interests
of both WHWC and Eaglebrook-interests which WHWC had acknowledged, ratified and
enjoyed via its dealings with the developers, SIDCO and Eaglebrook, subsequent to the
election of the independent WHWC board of trustees in May 1989.
Eaglebrook does not appeal the trial court's imposition of the constructive trust.
Eaglebrook can live with its obligations under the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement.
However, Eaglebrook has the right to expect that WHWC will honor its contractual
obligations under that agreement which were made in furtherance of the February 25,
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1988 settlement agreement. Eaglebrook gave valid and legal consideration for that
agreement. The trust remedy imposed by the trial court makes this reciprocal honoring of
contractual obligations by WHWC and Eaglebrook possible. Under these circumstances,
Eaglebrook enjoys no unjust enrichment, and it has every valid reason to retain the bare
legal title to the one-third share of the water distribution system. The trial court's order
effectively protects the interests of WHWC's shareholders. The order also negates the
litany of "problems" suggested by WHWC as reasons for requesting that Eaglebrook's
one-third title be returned to the water company at this time.
CONCLUSION IN RESPONSE
The trial court's directed verdict ruling that Cross-Appellee Tolman is not obligated
to convey 25 acre feet of water to WHWC should be upheld. That ruling is supported by
the overwhelming weight of the undisputed evidence and the inferences which could be
drawn therefrom even when viewed in a light most favorable to Cross-Appellant WHWC.
Likewise, this Court should uphold the constructive trust terms imposed upon CrossAppellee Eaglebrook regarding its continuing to hold bare legal title to the one-third
interest in WHWC's water distribution system, that is, in harmony with the January 19,
1989 Water Agreement. Cross-Appellant WHWC has not shown that the trial court
abused its discretion in fashioning this equitable remedy, particularly when viewed in the
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context of the trial court's application of the meaning of the unambiguous agreements of
January 19 and February 25, 1989.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ( ^ > day of August 1995.

CLYDE^SNDW & SWENSON, P.C.

UAOiaiak A.

y{i^^J

Susannah E. Kesler

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Tolman
and Cross-Appellees Tolman,
Eaglebrook Corp. and Lava Bluff
Water Company, Inc.
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August 1995 to Defendant/Appellee's counsel by U.S. first class mail, postageprepaid:
Jeffrey C. Wilcox, Esq.
Gallian, Westfall, Wilcox & Wright
First Security Bank Building
One South Main Street
P.O. Box 367
St. George, Utah 84771
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799
THE COURT:
MR, DUNN:
THE COURT:
MR. DUNN:
the special —

Mr, Dunn?
Yes,
Okay.
The exceptions that I have relate to

first of all, to the special verdict form.

I do not believe that the law is adequate or requires a —
or enables a jury to award attorney's fees in any way in
this particular case. And based on that, the special
verdict of the jury form, items seven and eight, are
improperly included.
I object to the instructions in the —

in the —

the instructions themselves that relate to those particular
issues —

specifically any instruction that deals with

fiduciary responsibility —

because the only damage that

can be claimed is the attorney's fees.

I do not believe

fiduciary responsibility or breach of fiduciary
responsibility should be included to the jury, and
therefore, based on that, I would except —

take exception

to Instruction No. 13, No. 14, No. 15, No. 16.
centers around the —

Again, it

even taking the issues of damages

being attorney's fees. And for that purpose, I would
except those particular items.
THE COURT:

All right.

And just so the record

is clear, we had discussed Mr. Dunn's exceptions prior to
going on the record.

The Court is relying on the case of

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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South Sanpitch Company versus Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, for the
proposition that if there was a breach of fiduciary duty,
attorney's fees incurred in litigation with third parties
to correct the effects of that breach may be assessed as
damages by the —

by the jury.

And that's the reason for

the inclusion of those instructions and those provisions in
the special verdict form.
MR. DUNN:

And it's my position —

position of the plaintiffs —

or the

that the interpretation

applied by the Court to South Sanpitch is wrong.
MR. WILCOX:

I think that the —

that the jury should decide the —

the statement

whether fees are

appropriate, and the Court will later decide the amount of
fees under reasonable standards —
standard —

under the reasonableness

I think that's an accurate statement.
THE COURT:

All right.

And that, of course, has

been stipulated to, that if we are going to assess
attorney's fees, the reasonable amount will be determined
at a later date by the Court; is that correct?
MR. DUNN:

That's right.

And, of course, that

stipulation is subject to the objection and exception.
THE COURT:
Okay.

I understand.

Let's go out, and we'll begin court

without the jury present for a brief motion, and then we'll
have the jury join us, and we'll proceed from there.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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